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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is an exploration into the choice of independent accountants made by 
industrial initial public offering (IPO) companies in Australia between the years 1994 
to 2004. The aim of this research is to determine which companies are more likely to 
use one of the Top 5 accountancy firms and in so doing we seek to offer some insight 
into understanding the likelihood of IPO companies adopting the services of the big 
accounting firms.  Our findings show, as predicted, that the majority of industrial IPO 
companies, and particularly the larger companies, used one of the Top 5 accountancy 
firms as their independent accountant.  However, unexpected was that certain industry 
types were less likely to hire a Top 5 accounting firm for their independent accounting 
services compared to other industry categories.  Our studies also found that after the 
year 2000 a smaller percentage of companies used independent accountants than 
between 1994 and 1999.  Many factors contribute to the selection of an independent 
accountant and this paper provides some understanding of identified factors and the 
influence that they have over the choice of independent accountants by industrial 
company IPOs. 
 
Keywords: Initial Public Offering, Independent accountant, Global Industry 
Classification Standard. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are companies that issue their shares to the public for 
the first time with those companies subsequently seeking to be listed on a stock 
exchange. As such, these companies aspire to give information about them in a 
reassuring and positive manner so that the best vantage point can be attained to attract 
potential investors. The main avenue for communication of information to the public 
is the prospectus. Alongside information such as the history, future plans, 
management and financial position of the company, a prospectus includes a report 
from an independent accounting firm endorsing whether or not the financial 
information contained in the prospectus ‘presents fairly’1.  It can be hypothesised that 
the reputation of the accounting firm is an important consideration for IPOs because 
                                            
1 The independent accountant report is ordinarily in the form of a review rather than an audit. The 
independent accountant usually uses the historical financial information and the pro-forma historical 
information included in the prospectus to perform the review and to compile the review statement.   
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the public may be more likely to trust the opinions of, and the association with, the 
more reputable accountancy firms. As a result, IPOs may be more likely to use one of 
the Top 5 accounting firms as their independent accountant.  
  
Accounting firms have been under much scrutiny following the implication of 
accountants in the demise of companies such as Enron, HIH, One-Tel, Harris Scarfe, 
and World Com.  Prior to the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, the Top 5 firms 
accounting firms consisted of Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.  It is these accounting firms that we refer to in 
this paper as the Top 5 accounting firms.  The Top 5 accounting firms, prior to the 
Arthur Andersen collapse, were highly regarded and had a hold on being the most 
reputable of accountancy firms. Companies used the ‘name’ of the Top 5 accounting 
firm to provide credibility and assurance to their shareholders.  Not only do IPOs face 
stringent regulatory compliance and reporting requirements, but they also strive to 
attract and reassure potential investors in their investment decision.  The hiring of a 
Top 5 independent accountant is one way that an IPO can help ease the anxiety of 
potential investors. 
 
This paper adopts some findings from earlier studies conducted exploring the 
connection between IPOs using one of the big accounting firms and the perceived 
credibility of the IPO (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986; Beatty 1989; Menon and 
Williams, 1991; Holland & Horton, 1993; How, Izan & Monroe, 1995; Hogan, 1997; 
Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998; Willenborg, 1999; Henry, Ahmed & Riddell, 2002; Lee, 
Stokes, Taylor & Walter, 2003).  This study expands from those earlier studies and 
explores industrial IPOs between 1994 and 2004 to analyse what, when and why IPOs 
are more likely to use one of the Top 5 accounting firms as their independent 
accountant.   
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly discusses some related 
IPO accountancy firm literature. Section 3 is a report of the findings. Section 4 
contains our conclusions. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) explain that IPOs exhibit some uncertainty about their value 
before listing.  As such, IPOs would be expected to reassure their potential investors 
that they are a sound and safe investment while also aiming to gain the best price 
possible for their shares. Beatty and Ritter (1986) also argue that underpricing, the 
difference between the closing market price on the first day of trading and the initial 
offering price, is directly related to uncertainty and is what IPO companies would 
want keep to a miminum.   
 
How, Izan and Monroe (1995) explored the impact that the reputation of the 
investigating accountant, the underwriter and the expert has on underpricing for 340 
industrial IPOs over the period of 1980 to 1990, found that “larger firms tend to hire 
higher reputation investigating accountants and experts”, and continue on to state that 
“IPOs associated with high reputation investigating accountants and experts have 
lower ex ante uncertainty surrounding the aftermarket issue price” (p.101).   
 
Firth & Liau-Tan (1998) purport that credibility of new share issues is linked to the 
choice of audit firm and further add that “high quality auditors are associated with 
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higher IPO market valuations and they allow entrepreneurs to retain lower ownership 
stakes in the IPO while maintaining market valuation” (p.145).  Beatty (1989) found 
that “hiring of a ‘nationally known’ audit firm is related to less underpricing of an 
initial public offering of equity securities” (p.708).   Consistent with Beatty (1989) 
and Firth & Liau-Tan (1998), Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Holland and 
Horton (1993) and Hogan (1997) also found that the hiring of a reputable auditor 
helps to ease underpricing.     
 
Menon and Williams (1991) contend that: 
“the reputation of the auditor is particularly likely to affect the perceived 
credibility of financial statements when a firm makes its initial public 
offering (IPO) of stock, Companies making IPOs typically are little known 
to investors, who, in the absence of alternative sources of information, must 
place substantial reliance on management’s reports.  If financial statement 
users differentiate between levels of auditor credibility, this should be more 
readily detected in the IPO market than in markets for older, better-known 
companies” (p.314).    
 
Lee, Stokes, Taylor and Walter (2003) examined the Australian IPO market prior to 
1990 and explored the relationship between IPOs using one of a Big 8 accounting 
firms and the extent of voluntarily disclosure information. Lee et al (2003) found that 
“IPO firms choosing a Big 8 auditor are less likely (rather than more) risky than those 
selecting a Non-Big 8 auditor” (p.390).  Lee et al (2003) add “…the use of a high 
quality auditor likely compliments the signalling value of increased voluntary 
disclosure” (p.398).   
 
Willenborg (1999) examined the demand for auditing in IPOs from the perspectives 
of the investors, the entrepreneurs and the auditors and argues that “the insurance 
demand for auditing is likely to dominate any information-based demand……..even 
in the small-deal segment of the IPO market…” (p.237). Willenborg’s findings are in 
contrast with our findings that the smaller IPOs (<$10million) are less likely to adopt 
the independent accounting services from one of the Top 5 accounting firms.   
  
Although previous studies have traditionally explored the relationship between 
investor confidence and the choice of accounting firm made by IPOs for auditing 
services, they do provide a good basis for understanding the relationship between 
accounting firm reputation, the factors that may influence reputation and the choice of 
accounting firms in general made by IPOs.  Previous studies have consistently found 
there to be a positive relationship between the choice of accounting firm and increased 
consumer confidence. This paper draws on prior related work and extends it to 
analysing the relationship between the choice of independent accountant and the size, 
industry type and year of listing of industrial IPOs between 1994 and 2004. 
 
3. DATA AND FINDINGS 
The analysis conducted is based upon data collected from the Connect 4 Prospectuses 
database. Accountancy firm and the total revenue turnover data came from the 
prospectuses of five hundred and seventy-four Australian industrial companies for the 
years 1994 to 2004.  As shown in Table 1, the majority of IPO companies used an 
accounting firm from the Top 5 accounting firms (61%) for their independent 
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accounting needs.  It appears the majority of IPOs believed they would benefit most 
by using a Top 5 accounting firm.  
 
Table 1: Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004 that used one of the Top 
5-accountancy firms for their independent accounting services. 
 
IPO Companies 
(1994 – 2004) 
TOTAL 
Number 
Used one of the 
Top  5 
accounting 
firms 
% that used 
one of the Top  
5 accounting 
firms 
Did NOT use 
one of the Top   
5 accounting 
firms 
% that did 
NOT use one 
of the Top   5 
accounting 
firms 
TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39% 
 
Table 2 reports the number of IPOs that used a Top 5 accounting firm according to 
size of the IPO. The data clearly shows that the smallest sized IPOs were less likely to 
use a Top 5 accounting firm (46% of IPOs raising less than $10million) than the 
biggest sized IPOs (96% of IPOs raising more than $80million). Overall, the larger 
IPOs were more likely to have used a higher profile accounting firm.  This result is 
not surprising for two reasons. Firstly, the larger companies are endeavouring to 
attract a much larger amount of investors and capital and therefore aim to provide the 
greatest reassurance possible to potential investors by hiring one of the more reputable 
accounting firms.  Second, the larger companies are more likely to afford the services 
of one of the Top 5 accounting firms. 
 
Table 2:  Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004, according to size, that 
used a Top 5-accountancy firm. 
 
 
 
Table 3 reports the number of IPO companies according to the universally recognised 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) that used a Top 5 accounting firm.  
Interestingly, the two most prevalent users of the Top 5 accounting firms for 
independent accounting services were the utilities group, #55, (78%) and the 
telecommunication services group, #50, (73%).  In part, this may be explained by the 
industry regulatory expectations on community services such as electricity, gas, water 
and telephone.  The next most prevalent users of the Top 5 independent accountants 
were the industrials, #20, (65%). This group includes industries such as aerospace and 
defence, construction and engineering, airlines, road and rail, etc. providing 
community and government services that are highly regulated and highly scrutinised 
Size of company 
by turnover 
 
$ 
Number of 
companies 
in this range 
Companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Percentage 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Companies 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Percentage 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
<10million 283 131 46% 152 54% 
10-29.99 million 148 97 66% 51 34% 
30-79.99 million 76 60 79% 16 21% 
>80 million 67 64 96% 3 4% 
 TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39% 
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by the public and therefore are more likely to need to use a reputable and high quality 
accounting firm.   
 
Table 3 reports that the remaining GICS category groups, except for the ‘consumer 
staples’ group, had at least half of their total use a Top 5 accounting firm.  Upon 
further investigation we found that the ‘consumer staples’ group includes a large 
percentage of small turnover firms (55% had a turnover of less than $10million).  The 
‘consumer staples group’ smaller percentage result (48%) is more likely to be the 
result of the size of the firms in this group rather than the industry type. 
 
Table 3:   Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004 in each Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) category that used a Top 5-accountancy firm  
 
Companies as per GICS category 
Number of 
companies in 
this group 
Companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Percentage 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Companies 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Percentage 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
# 15 Materials 16 8 50% 8 50% 
# 20 Industrials 181 117 65% 64 35% 
# 25 Consumer Discretionary 107 67 63% 40 37% 
# 30 Consumer Staples 33 16 48% 17 52% 
# 35 Health Care 89 52 58% 37 42% 
# 40 Financials 72 40 56% 32 44% 
# 45 Information Technology 16 8 50% 8 50% 
# 50 Telecommunication Services 51 37 73% 14 27% 
# 55 Utilities 9 7 78% 2 22% 
TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39% 
 
 
Table 4 reports the number of IPO companies for each year between 1994 and 2004 
that used a Top 5 accountancy firm.  The findings reveal that from 1994 to 1999, at 
least 64% of IPOs used a Top 5 accounting firm but from the year 2000 until the year 
2004  a decline in the use of the Top 5 accounting firms was evident showing that 
between 44% and 57% of IPOs used a Top 5 accounting firm.  The year 2002 reports 
the lowest percentage of users of a Top 5 accounting firm at 44%.  Reasons for this 
drop in usage after the year 2000 may be many but we speculate that the main reasons 
for the decline in using one of the Top 5 accounting firms are: 
i) the introduction of CLERP 9 and  
ii) the demise of Arthur Andersen.2   
 
CLERP 9 is the ninth instalment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(CLERP)3. CLERP was initiated in Australia in 1997 to allow for ongoing review and 
reform of regulation for Australia’s corporations and businesses and CLERP 9 was 
initiated in response to the HIH collapse in 2001 to address the regulations governing 
audit and independence requirements.  The Australian government engaged Professor 
                                            
2 Arthur Andersen collapsed in 2002.  Prior to its demise, Arthur Andersen was one of the  
Top 5 accounting firms.  
3 CLERP was enacted in 1999 and is known as the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 
1999. 
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Ian Ramsay4 to “undertake a comprehensive review of Australia’s existing legislative 
and professional requirements on the independence of auditors” (The Department of 
the Treasury, 2002, p.41).  In brief, CLERP 9 requires auditors to meet a standard of 
independence and auditors will be required to rotate after five years (Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill, 2003).  
 
We suppose that the timing of the new legislation in 1999 is associated with the 
decrease in the number of IPOs that used one of the Top 5 from the year 2000, as 
reported in Table 4.  The introduction of CLERP 9, in particular, that requires a 
rotation of auditors and enforces auditor independence by restricting external auditors 
to provide non-audit services to their clients, has possibly led IPOs to adopting 
independent accounting services from smaller to medium sized accounting firms to 
avoid any possible conflict of roles.     
 
Interestingly, however, CLERP (as distinct to CLERP 9) tightens regulations and 
“there have been significant increases in the level of prospectus stop orders issued by 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the introduction of 
criminal penalties and on-the-spot fines imposed by ASIC” (Gallery et al, 2006, p.1).  
CLERP introduced a new chapter 6D to the Corporations Law that governs prospectus 
disclosures and associated penalties for false, misleading or omitted information.  We, 
therefore, would have thought that the timing of the new CLERP legislation in 1999 
would have been a greater drive for IPOs to adopt one of the Top 5 accounting firms. 
However, our findings reported a decline in the number of IPOs using a Top 5 
accounting firm from the year 2000, and it therefore seems that the introduction of 
CLERP 9 that legislates auditor independence, was possibly a more influential factor 
for IPOs in their choice of an independent accountant.  
 
The second reason we suggest to explain the decline in IPOs using a Top 5 accounting 
firm after the year 2000 is the demise of Arthur Andersen.  Prior to the news in 2001 
that Arthur Andersen was involved with the Enron scandal, companies viewed that 
“an audit conducted by a small and relatively unknown firm, therefore, may not be 
worth much” (Thies, 2002, p.1).  Thies (2002) adds, “the value of stock of the Big 5-
audited public corporations seemed immune to such events” (p.1).  The Enron scandal 
was closely timed to an Australian disaster that also saw Arthur Anderson implicated.  
The HIH insurance group was placed in provisional liquidation in early 2001 (The 
HIH Royal Commission, 2003) and companies were leaving Andersen’s in large 
numbers.  Thies (2002) said that “at least 143 corporate clients, out of 2,311, have left 
Andersen…..” (p.1). It seems that those who left Andersen’s elected to adopt the 
services of accounting firms that did not belong to the Top 5 group because the 
number of IPOs using a Top 5 accounting firm declined (see Table 4), particularly in 
2002 where the smallest percentage for the 1994 to 2004 period was recorded.  The 
trust and confidence in the Top 5 accounting firms had diminished and IPOs were 
looking elsewhere for independent accounting services.  This second reason may be 
the more plausible.  
 
 
 
                                            
4 Professor Ramsay is in the Law school of Melbourne University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. 
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Table 4:  Number of IPO companies from 1994 to 2004, according to date of 
listing, that used a Top 5-accountancy firm. 
 
 
Year of IPO 
Listing 
Number of 
companies in 
this range 
Companies 
that used a 
Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Percentage that 
used a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Companies 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
Percentage 
that did NOT 
use a Top  5 
accountancy 
firm 
1994 46 34 74% 12 26% 
1995 20 16 80% 4 20% 
1996 24 21 88% 3 12% 
1997 33 21 64% 12 36% 
1998 31 22 71% 9 29% 
1999 97 66 68% 31 32% 
2000 136 78 57% 58 43% 
2001 39 20 51% 19 49% 
2002 34 15 44% 19 56% 
2003 35 19 54% 16 46% 
2004 79 40 51% 39 49% 
TOTALS 574 352 61% 222 39% 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This study explores the relationship between the choice of independent accountants 
made by IPOs and the size of the company, the year of IPO listing and the category of 
industry type.  In particular, this study investigates which Australian industrial IPOs 
were more likely to have used one of the Top 5 accounting firms for their independent 
accounting needs between the years of 1994 to 2004.  
 
The findings of this research confirm that most IPOs are likely to adopt one of the 
Top 5 accounting firms as their independent accountant.  Not surprising the findings 
also confirmed that larger sized IPOs are more likely to adopt one of the Top 5 
accounting firms as their independent accountant than smaller sized IPOs. However, 
more surprisingly, the findings revealed that a lower proportion of industrial IPOs 
used one of the Top 5 accounting firms from the year 2000 and that some industry 
types were more likely to use one of Top 5 accounting firms.  The year 2002 reported 
the lowest number of IPOs that used a Top 5 accounting firm (44%) and we speculate 
that this is related the demise of Arthur Andersen and the implication of Andersen in 
the downfall of some large companies.  Not only was there a diminishment in 
consumer confidence in the large accounting firms, but Andersen clients needed to 
look elsewhere for their independent accountant.  The industry type also seemed to be 
a factor in which accounting firm an IPO chose as their independent accountant.  The 
utilities group, the telecommunication group and the industrials group of IPOs were 
the most prevalent users of one of the Top 5 accounting firms.  We speculate that 
these findings are related to the industry regulatory expectations of these groups, and 
therefore IPOs in these groups are more likely to use a more reputed accounting firm.    
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